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The fall of China to Communism in 1949 and the subsequent Sino-
Soviet Treaty of Alliance, Aid, and Mutual Assistance signed in 
Moscow in 1950 brought great impacts to the US and British policy in 
Asia.  This article analyses the growing tension involving the Western 
powers with the Communist and the intensifying of the Cold War 
in the Asian region. The Anglo-American relations faced its trying 
times during this period as differences of approaches arise between 
the US and Britain in the issue of the containment of Communism in 
Southeast Asia.  This article aims to discuss actions and policies taken 
by the United States and British towards Southeast Asia in response 
to the advancement of communist in Asia. The methodology of this 
works utilizes documents analysis, predominantly through published 
governments records and secondary sources. This article revealed that 
the Americans were more into military approach whereas the British 
were more interested in the economic aspect. By September 1950, 
American officials began planning about the formation of a defence 
pact for Southeast Asia.  This defence pact came to materialise in 
1954 with the formation of Southeast Asia Treaty Organization or 
SEATO. SEATO was signed at a time when international Communism 
was making great inroads into Indochina and anti-colonialism was 
rampant. British supported the formation of SEATO and achieved its 
objective to commit the United States to defend Southeast Asia which 
previously was the responsibilities of Britain and France.  The period 
of 1950 – 1955 also mark the starting point for the American to be 
involved actively in the security affairs of Southeast Asia.
Keywords: US Foreign Policy, Communism, British Foreign Policy, Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organization, Colombo Plan.
Introduction
The period of 1950 – 1955 temporarily shifted the attention of the United 
States from Europe to the Southeast Asian region. In contrast with European 
issues, Asian issues never entered deeply into the Anglo-American relationship 
until the Korean War.  Britain seriously viewed the alarming situation in 
Asia as a threat to its economic interest and alerted the United States of the 
dangers of Communism in this area.  Britain also hoped to secure the American 
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commitment to the Southeast Asian area which was considered to be in the 
British sphere and for the overall defence of the free world. The period of 
1950-1955 was also important to the Southeast Asia region because during 
this time important events that shaped the future of this region took place. 
International events such as the Korean War and the formation of SEATO, 
gave a big impact on the Anglo-American relations vis-à-vis the Southeast 
Asian region.
 The vast literature on United States diplomacy and its involvement 
in Southeast Asia provides a good background for this article.  One of the 
earlier books on the United States involvement in Southeast Asia is Russell H. 
Fifield in American in Southeast Asia, The Roots of Commitment, describes the 
problems in Southeast Asia that had just emerged from colonialism. 1  Fifield 
also explores the relations of the United States with the former European 
colonial power in Southeast Asia especially Britain. Akira Iriye in The Cold 
War in Asia, provides a balanced and provocative interpretation on the shaping 
of Americas Asian Policy during the 1940s. 2  The Cold War and the aftermath 
of the Korean War led the United States to strengthen its position and its 
influence in Southeast Asia. Andrew Roadnight in his study United States 
Policy towards Indonesia in the Truman and Eisenhower Years examines the 
US policy towards Indonesian nationalism concludes that Truman’s support for 
independence was based on his Cold War priorities and not principled backing 
for self-determination.3 Phillip Darby in British Defence Policy East of Suez 
1947-1968, provides reader with the British defence policy post World War II 
in Asia.4  This book is based on the author’s research in primary documents 
and personal consultation with the political and service authorities.  Karl Hack 
in his work entitled Defence and Decolonisation in Southeast Asia, explains 
why British defence policy and practice emerged as it did in the period 1941-
67, by looking at the overlapping of colonial, military, economic and Cold War 
factors in the area.5 
This article put an emphasis on the primary sources especially 
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) published by the government 
of the United States. First is Foreign Relations of the United States 1950 Vol 
VI East Asia and the Pacific and second Foreign Relations of the United States 
1955-1957 Vol XXII Southeast Asia published respectively in 1976 and 1989. 
Documents from the British government especially Documents on British 
Policy Overseas, Series II, Vol IV, Korea June 1950-April 1951 were consulted 
to provide outlook on the actions taken by the British.
By examining the records from both the American and the British, 
and the secondary sources available, this article will provide us with a balanced 
point of view regarding the policies taken by both countries.
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The Asian Stage
The Asian stage of the Cold War opened with the communist success in China. 
On 1 October 1949, the People’s Republic of China was proclaimed by the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), led by Mao Tse Tung.  The Soviet Union 
extended its formal recognition a day later and accepted the Chinese revolution 
as the model for Asia. 6 The victory, coupled with the Russian atomic bomb 
was a blow to the West.  The American policy makers were deeply affected and 
concerned with the Sino-Soviet encouragement to Southeast Asian Communist 
insurgencies.  The US believed that the pattern of Soviet post-war expansion 
in Eastern Europe was to be repeated in Asia with China serving as Russian’s 
partner and the Asian base. 7 
The fall of China into the Communists hands left the Truman 
administration with two major options.  Many China experts argued that the 
United States should accommodate the Chinese revolution and attempt to 
negotiate with the Communists.  These experts believed that the open-door 
policy would be served best by attempting to influence the Communists as 
friends, rather than by cutting off communications and leaving Mao to pursue 
alliance with others.  From 1944 to 1949, this group of American officials 
such as General Joseph W. Stillwell, American Chief of Staff in China during 
the World War II, diplomats John Carter Vincent, John Paton Davies and 
Ambassador John Leighton Stuart, proposed the United States to ease its 
support for Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek and to open negotiations with 
the Communists.  None of these officials wanted a Communist-dominated 
China but all of them argued that negotiations with the CCP offered the best 
opportunity to achieve Americans’ goals there.  This group also urged that the 
United States encouraged Chiang to enter a political coalition with the CCP 
simply because Chiang could not destroy the Communist on the battlefield. 
Many American businesspeople, missionaries, journalist, and scholars 
supported these officials and their ideas.8
Other group of policymakers however, believed that it was 
already too late. These policy makers saw Communism as malevolent and 
expansionist. They believed that there was nothing left to do but quarantine 
China and resolved to prevent the revolution from spreading out.9  President 
Truman and his chief advisers agreed with this group of policy makers and 
believed that the Soviet Union and the Communist China were revolutionary 
powers, expanding in response of the demands of the communist ideology and 
were on to conquer the world.10  The assumption on communist ideology was 
the reason the negotiation option was quashed each time it was raised.  The 
administration believed that any serious overture to the communists would be 
inconsistent with the fundamental principles of containment.11  Besides this 
assumption, these policies were also based on the conclusion that the Chinese 
Communists would become part of the Communist world in which the United 
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States involved in Cold War.12 
In January 1950, the United States proceeded to develop the hydrogen 
bomb in response to the Russian atomic bomb explosion in September 1949.13 
The United States’ containment policy also drastically changed following the 
events in China. Secretary of State Dean Acheson defined the American line 
of defence in the Pacific. Acheson described the line of defence as running 
from the Aleutian Islands southward to Japan and then on southward to 
the Philippines.14 Korea was not included in this line of defence as the US 
had withdrawn its forces from South Korea in the previous year. Later in 
the spring of 1950 came National Security Council policy guideline NSC-
68, which proposed tripling of defence and military spending.  The United 
States was blocking Communist China’s admission to the United Nations, 
the Jessup committee found no support for a Pacific military pact to oppose 
“Communism’s” expansion after touring the region.  The Americans were also 
resolved to aid the French struggle against the Vietminh.
With the fall of China, the United States felt a new urgency to restore 
the role of Japan which was the key to the entire American position in the 
Pacific.  Japan would now take China’s place as an anti-communist defence in 
the Far East.  Within the framework of the containment policy, efforts would 
be taken to strengthen Japan in order to contain China. 15  However, Japan’s 
economic weakness prevented it from becoming a great power.  To fully 
recovered, Japan needed foreign trade, through which it could obtain food and 
raw materials in exchange for manufactured goods.  Before the war, China had 
been Japan’s principal trading partner, but as a Communist state, China could 
not fulfil this role.  The United States would have to find other trade partners 
for Japan.  Taiwan, South Korea and Southeast Asia were good alternatives for 
the Japanese.  Japan would manufacture industrial goods and textiles; it might 
trade then with Southeast Asia for the raw materials and food it needed so badly. 
The United States hoped that Japan would be self-supporting economically, 
then self-sufficient in defence, and became a contributor to collective security 
in East Asia.  The final status of Japan was formalized in the Peace Treaty and 
the American Japanese Security Treaty of 1951. 16
The ‘loss’ of China to Communism also saw British and American 
approach to China diverged.17 In November 1949, Malcolm MacDonald 
recommended recognition of China.  Britain would like to avoid provoking 
Chinese pressures on Hong Kong.  At the same time British also wanted to 
avoid driving China deeper into Soviet’s sphere.  When London considered 
recognizing Peking in the autumn of 1949, the Cabinet explained to the 
Americans that continued support for the Kuomintang would only drive 
the Chinese Communists in the direction of Moscow. 18  Britain extended 
recognition to China on 6 January 1950.  The United States, constrained by 
its record of supporting the Kuomintang and by powerful China lobby, instead 
demanded China first recognised its international obligations.  As the ‘loss’ of 
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China was a hot issue in American politics, British recognition brought Anglo-
American relations in the Far East to a low point.  The United States even said 
that the British tactic was as an echo of the 1930’s appeasement policy. 19
Before the Chinese issue was settled; the Korean War erupted in 
1950.  On 25 June 1950, North Korean forces invaded the Republic of Korea. 
The United States immediately tabled a resolution to the United Nations 
Security Council recommending that members of the United Nations provide 
assistance to the Republic of Korea to repel the armed attack. 20  The resolution 
was approved on 27 June, two days after the war had just begun (the Soviet 
Union had not attended the Security Council since January in protest against 
the exclusion of Communist China, and did not use its right of veto). 21  The 
same day, President Truman issued a statement indicating that he had ordered 
United States air and sea forces to give support to troops of the Republic of 
Korea under the command of Mac Arthur.  The civil war in Korea now had 
turned into a global crisis.
The significance of the Korean War, then, lay in the fact that its 
outbreak coincided with two crucial developments – China’s unification by the 
Communists, and a more vigorous American policy in Asia.  Besides this, the 
United States was also alarmed with developments in the communist world.  In 
February 1950, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance, Aid, and Mutual Assistance 
was signed in Moscow.  This treaty had a great impact on the United States 
policy and seemed to confirm the US belief that China was the Russian partner 
in Asia. The Truman administration began to reanalyze what had happened 
in China and Korea.  It concluded that the Chinese Communists intended to 
establish a whole new perimeter ranging from Korea in the north and Indochina 
in the south.
The United States through its responses in 1950 made it clear that 
it would redefine the structure of Asian-Pacific international relations on the 
basis of three principles: the revitalization of Japan once again as a power, the 
extension of American power in Southeast Asia, and the detachment of Taiwan 
from mainland China. 22 The development of the war in Korea has a special 
importance in the history of the Cold War, for it is the only instance in which 
the Communists have resorted to direct conventional military aggression. 23
The outbreak of Korean War in June 1950 had a deep impact to the 
British and put an end to the idea that its overseas forces might gradually 
be reduced.24  Although the British main concern was for Europe, the war 
confirmed British perception of the Communist threat in the Far East and the 
Middle East.25  The British thought that world Communism was on the march 
and a consolidation of Britain’s position was necessary. In Britain and as well 
as in the United States, the war was seen as an indication that Communist 
policy had hardened towards the West.  
The British decision to support the United States against North Korea 
was also mainly prompted by the belief that a failure to resist Communist 
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aggression anywhere in the world would encourage further Soviet moves, 
and that support of the United States in the Far East was needed to guarantee 
American involvement in the defence of Europe. 26  The British also felt that 
the least that Britain could do was to assist its ally in its attempt to resist 
aggression and thereby prevent further communists’ encroachment: if action 
was not taken in Korea now, then Indochina, Hong Kong and Malaya would 
soon be the next target on the communists’ list.27  Describing North Korean 
action as ‘naked aggression’ British Prime Minister Attlee, authorised British 
naval forces to assist those of the United States in Korean waters.  The first air 
strikes were launched from a British carrier on 1 July. 28
On 11 September, President Truman signed a directive prepared 
by the National Security Council allowing MacArthur to drive beyond the 
38th parallel.29  The decision to cross the 38th parallel was a shift from the 
policy of ‘containment’ as defined by President Truman in 1947 to a policy of 
‘liberation’ or the rolling back of Communism.   On 27 September, President 
Truman instructed General MacArthur to move through North Korea if he did 
not encounter Chinese or Russian resistance and if he was certain of success 
in the field.  MacArthur accepted this instruction as an invitation for him to 
march to the border of China at the Yalu River.  Although China gave a stern 
warning to the United States that it would not “sit back with folded hands 
and let the Americans come to the border”.30 On 21 November the American 
troops reached the Chinese border at the Yalu River.  Five days later, on 26 
November the Chinese moved across the Yalu in mass, trapping and destroying 
large numbers of United Nations troops, including 20,000 Americans and 
Koreans at the Chosin Reservoir.  Two further mass Chinese Communist Force 
offensives, aimed at the conquest of South Korea, in April and May 1951 were 
smashed by the United States troops in a battle around the Parallel.  Defeated 
on the battlefield, the Communists sued for peace on the basis of status quo in 
the July armistice negotiations that began at Kaesong, and later transferred to 
Panmunjom.  The truce agreement was signed at Panmunjom on 27 July 1953, 
after Dulles had threatened Peking through Indian diplomatic channels that 
atomic war might soon be carried to Mainland China.  This armistice confirmed 
the partition of Korea based on the battlefront of July 1951.31 Communist 
China had fought the United States to a standstill.  
The decision to cross the 38th proved exceptionally costly to the 
United States. Four-fifths of all American casualties in the war occurred after 
United Nations forces crossed the parallel.32 The total casualties of the war 
were four million, including of 140,000 US casualties. The war froze the 
United States into a Cold War posture for the next two decades, paralysing 
particularly American-Chinese relations. 
Although Britain supported the United States in the Korean War, the 
British differed on certain issues regarding the war.  The British believed that 
they saw an opportunity to develop a Sino-Soviet split.  They also feared that 
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the Far Eastern war would divert American attention and efforts from Europe. 
Finally, the British worried that American truculence or ‘MacAthurism’, would 
trigger World War III.33  Throughout the war, British showed herself more 
interested in negotiation than victory and more worried about confronting the 
Chinese than the Americans.  Shortly after the war, the British Ambassador in 
Moscow explored the possibility of a return to the status quo ante. He reported, 
and Foreign Secretary Bevin passed the words on to the Americans, that while 
the Soviet seemed favourable they would probably link a ceasefire with the 
withdrawal of American protection from Taiwan and the bestowal of UN 
membership on Peking.  President Truman and Acheson reacted with anger, 
and firmly refused to negotiate on these items “under the duress and blackmail 
then being employed”. Reluctantly the British dropped the project. 34
The British also argued that the coordination of Anglo-American 
policy was virtually non-existent and in the Far East the American policy 
has paid least regard to the interest of other powers.  As a consequence, the 
Americans enjoyed the least sympathy and support in the Far East. 35  The 
British added that the unilateral American action in preventing Chinese 
invasion of Taiwan, on the grounds that Communism must be contained in 
Asia, increased the distrust amongst Asians of American motives in Southeast 
Asia and could provoke a pan-Asian reaction in the minds of the Governments 
and people of that area.  
On the other hand, the British shared the happiness which followed 
MacArthur’s counter-offensive after the Inchon landing in September. 36 At 
the same time however, the British became uneasy about possible Chinese 
intervention in the war.  Foreign Secretary Bevin urged Acheson to issue a 
statement reassuring China and to permit participation by Peking in UN debates 
on Korea.  Acheson responded to that “we should not be duly frightened at 
what was probably a Chinese Communist bluff” and later Bevin did not press 
the point.37  The British generals even suggested that the American stopped at 
the narrow waist of North Korea, Churchill and other Conservatives publicly 
endorsed the idea, but the Labour Government refused to criticize MacArthur’s 
advance. 
In the wake of the Korean War, the British government then 
embarked on a major rearmament programme in fear of a general war.  In 
September 1950, the revised expansion programme was announced.  It was 
directed towards strengthening the three services (the army, the air force and 
the navy) for the global conflict after the style of the Second World War.38  On 
17 May 1951, President Truman approved a National Security Council policy 
statement, which asserted that the United States should “maintain the security 
of the offshore defence line: Japan-Ryukyus-Philippines-Australia and New 
Zealand.  Deny Taiwan to any Chinese regime aligned with or dominated by 
the Soviet Union and expedite the strengthening of the defensive capabilities 
of Taiwan.  Attempt by all practicable means to forestall communist aggression 
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in South and Southeast Asia”.  It had flatly stated that “Soviet control of the 
off-shore islands in the Western Pacific, including Japan, would present an 
unacceptable threat to the security of the United States”.39  
Although the war was limited to Korea, President Truman and 
Secretary of State, Acheson used the war as an opportunity to develop new 
American policies around the globe. Because of these American initiatives, 
the six months between June and December 1950 ranked among the most 
important period of the Cold War era.  Truman and Acheson moved to the 
offensive globally for two particular reasons: the Korean War gave them an 
opportunity to silence their critics at home and to take advantage of new 
openings abroad. 40
Later on 20 August 1954, a policy statement of the National Security 
Council under President Eisenhower called for maintaining the security and 
increasing the strength of the “Pacific off-shore island chain”’ – Taiwan was 
included – as “an element essential to the United States security”.41 The Joint 
Chiefs of Staff believed the American effort, if undertaken, should be part of a 
collective action by the United Nations in conjunction with Britain and other 
friendly government.  President Eisenhower on 16 January 1954 approved a 
policy declaration of the National Security Council calling for fitting American 
military action against Communist China if Peking made an overt armed attack 
against Malaya.42As dependencies of Britain, Malaya and Singapore had 
no independent voice in the Korean War or the Japanese peace settlement. 
However, British embargo on rubber to the People’s Republic of China as part 
of the United Nations effort in Korea clearly affected Malaya and Singapore.43 
The American was clearly interested in showing its military strength as 
military power is closely allied with political power.  Military power provides 
the element of terror and this element “can be used to overcome threats from 
outside as well as from subject within the polity. 44
Seato
By 1954, the United States and its allies began to subscribe to the ‘Domino 
Theory’ to justify its involvement in Southeast Asia.  This theory believed that 
if one country in the region fell into the communists, the other would follow 
like toppling dominoes.  With this theory in mind, the United States began 
seriously planning for the defence of Southeast Asia with its allies.
The idea of a defence pact for Southeast Asia was first mentioned 
by Representative Jacob Javits of New York, a member of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee in mid-1950.  By September 1950, John Foster Dulles 
began openly talking about such an alliance.  However, the Southeast Asia 
Collective Defence Treaty or Manila Pact under which the Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization or SEATO came to materialise only on 8 September 1954. 
It was widely believed that the formation of SEATO was a product of the 
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bloodshed at Dien Bien Phu and of the Geneva settlement on Indochina.45  It 
was signed at a time when international Communism was making great inroads 
into Indochina and anti-colonialism was rampant.  
From 21 July when the Geneva Conference ended to 8 September 
when the Manila Treaty was concluded, intense and complex negotiations 
were conducted in various capitals on the terms and membership of SEATO. 
Although modelled after NATO, SEATO lacked the binding commitments 
to the use of force because the signatories agreed only to consult in case of 
aggression.46  SEATO was a device whereby three great powers – the United 
States, Britain and France – have undertaken to support and protect a number 
of small states of Southeast Asia – Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan 
together with South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia against the extension of the 
influence of other great powers, principally Communist China and the Soviet 
Union.47  In line with the Geneva agreements, Cambodia, Laos and South 
Vietnam were designated as territory protected under the treaty (‘protocol 
states’), but could not be participating members.48  
One of the explicit purposes of SEATO was to counter communist 
subversion in Southeast Asia.49 The United States also saw SEATO as a device 
to give it military access to the region.50 Besides this, SEATO was also a 
form of psychological warfare to support the allies, rather than a defensive 
organization alone.51
The United States was the most important power in SEATO and was 
the acknowledged leader of the group.  American support for the small states 
of Southeast Asia in the form of military protection and economic aid unfolded 
independently of SEATO.  Britain and France also played an important part 
in founding the organization, but had since been increasingly occupied in 
the affairs of Europe, had reduced their responsibilities in Southeast Asia.52 
Britain’s purposes of participating in SEATO were to defend its economic 
interest; access to the raw materials, and trade routes to and from their sources, 
and beyond to and from Australia and New Zealand.53 The British also viewed 
the Southeast Asian Defence Treaty as a way of avoiding British commitments 
by means of American deterrence.54
The problem of containing Communist expansion in Asia continued 
to worry the Eisenhower administration.  In August 1954, the National 
Security Council concluded that the Geneva accords on Indochina had been 
a ‘disaster’ that “completed a major forward stride of Communism which 
may lead to the loss of Southeast Asia”.55 The French had simply sought to 
save face in agreeing to the elections scheduled for 1956, which they realized 
would probably result in a victory for Ho Chi Minh.  Dulles, determined to 
save at least half of Indochina, persuaded Eisenhower to accept the NSC 
recommendations for extending military, economic and political aid to the 
Vietnamese nationalists in the south led by Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem. 
Direct aid to South Vietnamese meant that the United States had now taken 
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over the French role in Indochina.56  France quickly lost interest in SEATO 
soon after 1954 and in military matters its contribution had been small and of 
necessity.57
With reference to China, prior to 1954, the British opposed the 
strategies which called for large-scale attacks.  The British feared that any 
American action might escalate and trips a new world war involving the 
nuclear attack.  The Australian, New Zealand and Malayan Area (ANZAM) 
meeting in Singapore in December 1954 acknowledged that the United States 
would almost certainly use nuclear weapons in attack against mainland China. 
In 1955, the threat to Malaya was again reassessed on the assumption of 
American attack against China. The Australian defence machinery which was 
coordinating the Commonwealth war plans in the Malayan Area when pressed 
by Britain to proceed with the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve stated that 
it required American cooperation in planning Malayan defence.  Britain also 
hoped that the formation of a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve might help 
secure the United States interest in Malayan defence. 58     
By January 1955, Admiral Radford, Chairman of the United States 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, reassured Admiral Lambe, Commander – in – Chief of 
British Far Eastern Fleet, that, in global war, American air action would leave 
only a limited threat to Malaya.  In March, Radford stressed that the defence 
of Malaya was the ‘last ditch’.  The American nuclear interdiction would 
eliminate any Chinese thrust towards Malaya and possibly put China on the 
defensive.  However, on 14 March, President Eisenhower stated that Malaya 
was of integral importance to Southeast Asian defence and Australia would be 
eligible for American aid.  The defence of Malaya received another good news 
on 15 March when Secretary of State Dulles told Australian Prime Minister 
Robert Menzies that American believed the Kra position was necessary if 
Thailand became communist and the Australian would receive American 
support if the operation to occupy Kra position was deemed necessary.59
The British also announced its defence policy in Southeast Asia in 
March 1955.  Malcolm Macdonald, the Commissioner-General for Southeast 
Asia stated that the British envisaged three lines of defence; first, local peoples 
and governments who were ‘by nature hostile to Communism’, but lacking in 
confidence; secondly, supporting SEATO and encouraging the Colombo Plan 
and economic assistance; thirdly, encouraging the ‘benevolent neutrality’ of 
the Colombo Powers. 60
The United States, by June 1955, acknowledged that the rising 
tide of Communist subversive activity in Singapore as a direct reflection 
of developments elsewhere in Southeast Asia.  Frank G. Wisner, Deputy 
Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency in a memorandum to the 
President’s Special Assistant, Rockefeller mentioned that since the fall of Dien 
Bien Phu and the Geneva Conference, there had been a marked acceleration of 
Communist-inspired and directed activities in Singapore and to a lesser extent 
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in Malaya. 61  Britain and the United States agreed that communist subversion 
was the primary threat to Southeast Asia and both countries agreed that most 
assistance would be bilateral.  
The Federation of Malaya and the State of Singapore had close 
links with Britain but remained outside SEATO.  Singapore was the main 
British base east of Suez from which forces could be deployed in case of a 
SEATO emergency.  The Federation of Malaya had a defence agreement with 
the United Kingdom, which authorized, among other things, maintenance 
of Commonwealth troops and bases.  But despite its own internal security 
problems, the close links with Thailand, after independence in Malaya had 
declined to enter SEATO. 62  Malaya’s refusal to join SEATO partly because 
it has a defence pact with British through the Anglo-Malayan Defence Pact 
formalised during the independence in 1957.63 Malaya also maintained a very 
close relationship with other Commonwealth countries especially Australia 
and New Zealand.  In 1960s this closed relationship was further strengthened, 
and Australia even promised to send its military forces to defend the newly 
formed Malaysia in Konfrontasi with Indonesia. 64
Conclusion
The period of 1950-1955 shifted the attention of the United States and Britain 
away from Europe to the east of Asia.  The fall of China and followed by 
the Korean War gave a very deep impact on the United States foreign policy, 
especially towards its perception of the communist.  Here, the communist was 
seen as an expansionist power and on the way to conquer the world.  The fall 
of China into the communist hands also shattered the hope of making China 
one of the ‘Big Four’ to police the post war world in the East and economically 
it also closed the China market for the United States goods.  A sense of crisis 
also developed in Washington as officers in the State Department tried to find 
the best way to deal with Communist China.  The policy of containment was 
at last adopted by the Truman administration and all negotiations options were 
rejected.   
The Anglo-American relationship also differed in opinion and 
approach towards Communist China. Britain continued to place greater 
emphasis on America on the need for a political approach to the Cold War 
in Asia.    While the United States pursued the policy of containment and 
suspected that appeasement would be interpreted as weakness, the British on 
the other hand recognized Communist China in early 1950.   This step was 
probably taken to save British colony of Hong Kong from the communists. 
The British also hoped to separate China from the Soviet Union.  During the 
Korean War, despite differences in opinion on how to tackle the North Korean 
invasion, the British supported the military action led by the United States 
under the United Nations mandates.  Britain also sought an allied strategy, 
Jebat  Volume 46 (1) (July 2019) Page | 89
The United States and British Southeast Asian Security Policy 1950 – 1955
combining military and political policies.  
The British decision to support the United States in Korea was 
also based on a [rather more] calculated assessment of the risks and benefits 
involved.  Of particular importance in this context was the belief that, if Britain 
wanted continuous American support in Europe in the future, then it would 
have to provide a clear demonstration of its moral and material commitment to 
the defence of the free world.  Britain also assumed that by joining the United 
States in the Korean campaign, it would be better able to restrain the Americans 
from taking a course of military action that might lead to an escalation of the 
conflict and jeopardizing its colony of Hong Kong or Malaya.  The British 
aims at the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina, was to create a buffer 
of non-communist countries as far to the north of Malaya as possible; and 
to avoid committing its own resources, or too many of its allies’ resources. 
British perception of its role at Geneva also reaffirmed the belief that Britain 
had an important regional role to play.  The British hoped that South Vietnam 
could be neutralized, defended by diplomacy and not by military intervention. 
With this, Britain hoped to create a regional stability for Malaya and Singapore, 
with their importance dollar earnings and to Anglo-Australian relations. 
With the formation of SEATO, British achieved its objective to commit the 
United States to defend Southeast Asia which previously was the responsibilities 
of Britain and France.  Besides persuading the American to be involved in the 
affairs of Southeast Asia, Britain had a very distinct policy in Malaya.  The 
British government was determined to restore order in Malaya and to guide 
Malaya towards self-government within the Commonwealth. The security 
and defence of Malaya was of very great importance and Britain felt that any 
reduction of effort or sign of weakness would be a great encouragement to the 
Communists. 
The differences of approach towards Communism in Asia were seen 
from the early 1950s.  The US started its military containment in Vietnam in 
May 1950, a month before the Korean War erupted.  Its policy of military 
containment continued with the sending of Melby-Erskine Mission also 
known as the MDAP (Mutual Defence Assistance Programme) and lastly 
the US sponsored SEATO.  Britain however, focussed more on the economic 
aspect of the containment.  The British believed that the economic conditions 
in Southeast Asia then were favourable for the spread of Communism and 
suggested “an Asian equivalent of the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Pact”.65 
The Colombo Plan was later formed by British and the Commonwealth 
countries to provide economic and technical assistance to the Asian countries. 
This Plan unfortunately failed to achieve its long-term objective to improve 
economic and social conditions in Southeast Asia. Britain’s position as a great 
power continued to decline after 1955, with the Suez Crisis that forced British 
to evacuate the Middle East.  Britain became more dependent on the United 
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States for economic recovery and for the defence of its territories overseas.  
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